Here we go…

Response to FAA Docket 2019-1100 (Remote ID NPRM)

Hello

I am writing in response to the FAA NPRM for Remote UAS ID (Docket # 2019-1100). I am a U.S. citizen, a veteran, and a UAS pilot, and would like to address some issues and concerns I had when reading the NPRM, as well as provide some suggested alternative solutions. Thank you for providing the opportunity to do so.

The UAS Remote ID (and Tracking) proposal appears to be based on two valid concerns; NAS safety and NAS security. I would like to address how (for each category) the proposed NPRM could potentially cause more safety and security issues than it solves. I would also like to concurrently suggest some methods which might suit the FAA’s goals and objectives in a better manner than the proposed NPRM does.

1. National Security: while visibility of all UAS in the NAS could potentially increase overall awareness of the NAS (and thus potentially result in increased security), the NPRM as it stands potentially serves to work against national security objectives, to wit:
   1. The proposed ID method would be effective only if widely adopted and enforced. In the event of widespread non-compliance, the national security goals would be subverted, with more unidentified aircraft in the NAS, and national security agency resources misused or diverted in tracking down non-compliant pilots, instead of focusing on credible and tangible threats to the NAS and national security.
   1. The rules in regards to amateur-built UAS would virtually force (or at best, likely result in) widespread non-compliance, and thus increase A) national security/NAS security/safety issues and B) the number of unregistered and unidentified aircraft in our nation’s skies.
   1. Due to the nature and flying habits of amateur-built UAS pilots, their needs will not be served by FRIA ‘drone parks’, for the following reasons:
      1. These FRIA are very limited in number and often at some distance from the majority of potential users
      1. Amateur-built UAS (especially for FPV and racing applications) require a fairly large amount of space (which FRIA as existing typically do not provide)
      1. Forcing this segment of the UAS population into ‘drone parks’ (or drone concentration camps, as the more obstreperous term them) would actually result in less safety, with faster and more agile UAS forced to share space with slower traditional RC aircraft. The potential for conflict (both in the airspace and on the ground) makes this method a safety concern in itself.
      1. The number and amount of approved FRIA nationwide is insufficient to support the large numbers of amateur-built UAS pilots (for example in my home state of Colorado, with a high number of UAS pilots, there is only one FRIA).
      1. Allowing the FRIA to be operated only by currently-recognized CBOs (Community-Based Organizations) such as the AMA would result in unfair circumstances, as most of the existing FRIA are designed for (and primarily utilized by) legacy RC model aircraft pilots. The goals, objectives, and social culture of the two groups (RC ‘modelers’ and UAS racers) are incompatible, and there is no indication the RC-based AMA sites would willingly A) welcome B) support or C) allow their airspace to be shared with UAS pilots.
   1. The national security asset comprised by a group of concerned citizen pilots nationwide is currently undeveloped, but remains (in potential, at least) a considerable asset, which would be nullified if the NPRM passes as written.
      1. A similar example is the ‘ham’ radio system comprised of radio operators in the American Radio Relay League (ARRL). In times of national disaster, they could be a critical asset, and they work actively with government (FCC, etc.) to maintain this asset.
      1. Recreational UAS pilots could be a potential asset for national security as well, as they have potential nationwide visibility, and can act as parts of a surveillance/reconnaissance network in times of disaster. Note UAS are already being integrated commercially in emergency response implementations (and citizen UAS pilots could conceivably augment these efforts considerably, in a similar manner as the ARRL disaster teams).
      1. The NPRM rules as written would nullify this potential national security asset, by increasing costs, limiting access to the skies (and thus reducing interest in the hobby and potential numbers of pilots to participate in such programs, should they be implemented)
   1. Increased surveillance of UAS, and even a NRT view of the NAS will not increase national security. As example, I would ask you to consider the case of the U.S. borders: quite a bit of sensor data exists, and a relatively good view of the status is available to the national security and law enforcement agencies. Yet, despite this increased surveillance and ground-space awareness, the nation is no more secure, and an ongoing disregard of our borders, legal authority, and national security efforts is evidenced daily, in the news and media.  

• NAS Safety: Addition of commercial UAS delivery services presents an exponentially greater safety threat than the existence of recreational and limited commercial UAS, as currently exists in the NAS.
  • Rather than place the burden of compliance with the existing UAS population, I would suggest the responsibility should be placed more squarely on that segment of the UAS population which wishes to merge with the existing aircraft (for their own profit); e.g., those multinational corporations seeking to do business in the NAS of the United States by providing UAS-based delivery services and other related services
  • Rather than basing the NPRM on future technologies (such as 5-G wireless, a pre-requisite for such plans) and undeveloped technologies such as ACAS (Aircraft Collision and Avoidance Systems) for UAS, I suggest that those who wish to enter the NAS safely for commercial profit should be required to demonstrate to the FAA operational, tested technologies that can be implemented currently, instead of at a future date, when notional new technologies become available
  • I suggest the FAA general rules and requirements defined in the NPRM apply specifically (and solely) to these corporate entities, to allow for their safe integration into the NAS. I suggest recreational pilots continue to fly by current rules, and the corporations implement their operations and technologies to both obey FAA mandates and to safely merge with existing air traffic. Meanwhile, recreational UAS could meet the Remote ID and Tracking requirements using inexpensive, existing, and easily implementable technological solutions.
  • The nature of recreational flight defines the flight operations, flight capabilities, and NAS usage times. Due to the limitations of battery-supply (virtually all recreational UAS are battery-powered) and radio control link distance limitations, the usage of the NAS is sporadic, and occurs only in a limited area, range, and time period.
  • The nature of commercial UAS delivery services defines longer flight operations, and more consistent presence in the NAS. Delivery UAS will exhibit longer ‘endurance’, and the fleet of drones will assure a much larger percentage of these UAS in the skies, for longer times, at any given time period when compared to the sporadic and limited nature of recreational UAS usage.
  • Potential airspace contention issues (and resultant safety concerns) can be minimized by limiting commercial delivery services into designated air routes (perhaps using a modification of the existing DOT Intelligent Transport System model). Naturally, recreational drones might be excluded from (or warned away from) these routes, but could then fly in areas not specifically in a ‘delivery corridor’

• Safety Impact for the General Public

Use of UAV as a reconnaissance tool for various outdoor activities can help increase safety, by improved awareness of the route ahead, and identification of possible hazards. This use could serve to reduce the number of accidents, and associated search and rescue costs  

Use of UAV for personal safety, for example by joggers at night or in potentially dangerous places, can increase personal safety by acting as a deterrent. UAS which autonomously follows citizens (at a low altitude) and provide warning light or siren (panic button) and emergency calling services could potentially prevent many types of personal, violent crime, such as robbery, rape, or assault

Use of UAS to inspect a homeowner’s premises without exposing one’s self to danger (ladders and power lines, for example) or the elements (winter ice, etc.) can markedly increase safety at home.

Under the NPRM, these UAV-derived benefits to citizens (among others yet imagined or implemented) would be illegal. As such, it would deprive the public a method for improving personal (and neighborhood) safety, and thus the overall safety of society.  

• National Security Implications for the General Public

The rules proposed under the NPRM would negatively impact and affect the overall national security, at the national, regional, and local levels.

If UAS rules and regulations (and operational price) increase, the UAS technology and benefit will not begin to expand to include the general public.

One of the best monitoring and surveillance tools available to law enforcement and national security agencies is the well-intentioned, law-abiding citizen with an awareness of the local neighborhood and region. Their ability to identify possible threats or suspicious activities, and to provide law enforcement with actual evidence and documentation of illegal activities (as opposed to mere eyewitness accounts, most of which are not admissible, positive, or legally valid as documented evidence) would be severely reduced or eliminated under the proposed rules of the NPRM.

In the event of regional or national disaster, citizen-flown UAS can provide authorities an increased amount of real-time surveillance, assist in providing positive identification of threats and conditions, and increase resources available to disaster response teams and incident commanders. 

• Legal Issues:
• Forcing a Remote ID requirement on individual pilots presents a case of virtual mass surveillance, illegal per existing United States law. (50USC1801, Mass Collection of Data)
• Specifically ‘targeting’ a segment of the population for mass surveillance (whether forced or voluntary) presents a civil rights concern, and places the FAA in the undesirable position of being seen as an enforcer of unfair, unjust, or ‘bad’ laws, instead of as a neutral enforcer of and advocate for laws, rules, and regulations that simultaneously promote airline safety and national security, while preserving the legal and civil rights of the population.

• Civil Rights Issues:
• Segregation of the population by pastime (or business) is illegal as well as inadvisable from both common-sense and legal standpoints.
• Allowing ‘corporate citizens’ to have priority over the needs and goals of actual individual citizens is unconscionable at best and most likely illegal. It is contradictory to the best traditions of the FAA.

Note the designation of certain groups for limited access to the NAS effectively outlaws members of those groups, creating outlaws from what were once basically honest citizens. The cost for enforcing such exclusionary laws would have a large impact on the A) national budget B) constraints under which the national security and law enforcement organizations already operate, and C) make distinction between ordinarily honest citizens disobeying exclusionary laws and ‘bad actors’ (with no love or respect for the United States, its laws, or aviation in general) difficult at best.

The effects of draconian laws (targeting specific groups of individuals) on national cohesiveness, the economy, and social issues too numerous to define can be seen by the US ‘war on drugs’, or prohibition on alcohol, which have taken such a high toll and resulted in such a high national cost, both in health, money, and law enforcement resources. Any time in our national history where we have targeted a distinct group of citizens, the results have been bad and the associated costs high.

• Suggested Alternatives
  • Airspace segregation

By segregating the NAS (or at least high-density population areas and projected delivery routes) much of the potential for airspace contention and collision would be avoided.

Dedicating such segregated airspace would require re-definition of airspace (a task well within the capabilities and purview of the FAA, and one easily accomplished).

By segregating a portion of the existing airspace (and an additional component), the altitudes between (for example) 300 and 500’ AGL could be reserved for UAS delivery routes. The airspace between 0 and 300’ AGL could be dedicated for recreational UAS, and for commercial and emergency UAS services which require access to such space. This would leave only vertical corridors to and from launch and delivery sites as potential areas of contention.

The vertical corridors for launch and landing of delivery UAS could be negotiated by a number of techniques, among them:

TFR (Temporary Flight Restriction) could be activated just prior to use of the intended vertical delivery corridor

Advisory signaling from delivery craft prior to ascent or descent from these corridors could be sent either electronically, visually, audibly, or a combination of techniques, as deemed appropriate for the intended corridor  

Real-time (or NRT) location of delivery UAS, through a mechanism similar to Flight Aware, could be available to all recreational pilots, or even consolidated into their flight control display (as advisories) or flight control system (as temporary or permanent ‘geo-fences’)

• Limitation of Remote ID requirements

Limiting the Remote ID and Tracking of UAS to high population density areas and to potential delivery routes for commercial UAS would serve the FAA’s safety goals and still allow access to a large portion of the NAS for more limited commercial and ongoing recreational UAS flight operations.

• Implement Broadcast ID Requirements Only

Using only the broadcast ID technique would A) ease and accelerate implementation, as it could be accomplished relatively easily, B)  have the added benefit of integrating existing UAS into the Remote ID ‘ecosystem’

• TLA Utilization

The effective implementation of Remote ID does not necessarily imply global implementation. I suggest that due to the varied airspace conditions within each type of TLA (Technology Level Area, as defined by NASA), various implementations of Remote ID could be safely and effectively implemented.

In rural areas where little air traffic exists in Class G airspace, no planned commercial UAS (CUAS) delivery routes exist, are planned (or are likely), there is little reason to regulate or restrict recreational UAS flight.

The proposed Drone Zoning and Integration Act (proposed by Senator Mike Lee) define a two-hundred foot limit to personal property. To some parties (apparently including Senator Lee and his staff), this would provide a sense of security, and extend the homeowner’s ‘rights’ further into national airspace (a domain reserved to the FAA). Some see it as the freedom to either exclude drones from some areas and properties, while others see it as a way to allow drones in certain areas.

Either way, this is contradictory to FAA airspace zoning and control. However, in addition to segmenting airspace for (primarily) commercial and recreational usage, the FAA could also choose to designate the space between (for example) average treetop altitude and one hundred foot AGL (for example) as primarily dedicated for sports UAS. These systems operate primarily at lower altitudes, and present no privacy or safety issues with home and property owners. This allows ‘camera drones’ to be used in their optimum range of altitudes of one hundred to three hundred foot AGL. This altitude is removed enough that even with the best camera technology, the perceived ‘privacy’ and the fear of unwanted surveillance is reduced to the point of non-existence.

Again, basic airspace layer segregation would increase safety by reducing the possibilities for airborne collisions and space contention between commercial, recreational, and sport UAS. Of course, in the end the airspace would be shared by all and contention issues would need to be dealt with, as more experiential data is accrued and as applicable emerging technologies become well-tested and available.

• Financial and Practical Considerations

As it stands, the NPRM proposes a very expensive means of implementation, with high costs to the FAA, the remote pilot, and society (and based on technologies which do not currently exist in an operational state). This works against the FAA goals of implementing solutions which can be quickly and easily activated. ‘Off the shelf’ methods of Remote ID are currently available at low or little cost, and are easy to implement.

The NPRM proposes a solution based on ‘vaporware’; technology which is anticipated to exist soon, or is under (costly) development. Setting standards based on technology and applications which do not currently exist merely obfuscates the issue, serves to delay implementation, and is counter to the FAA goals of timely and cost-effective implementation.

To propose a ‘billion dollar solution’ which may become reality at some future date over a cost-effective solution which currently exists both opposes the FAA goals and has an additional negative, in that implementation of such ‘solutions’ serves to increase public perception that A) the FAA is inept B) the FAA is ‘under the thumb’ of Big Business and merely facilitating their goals and C) that the FAA somehow has malicious intent in this…all untrue (as far as I can tell), but all would be easily adopted viewpoints given the circumstances. Perception of the FAA as an unfair actor who has the interests of big business over the safety of the NAS and the welfare of pilots only serves to reduce FAA effectiveness, by making them seem a ‘public enemy.’   

• Suggested Interim Measures

The immediacy ascribed to this NPRM is felt only by the multinational corporations who stand to make huge profits by quickly implementing UAS-based delivery services in our NAS. I would suggest it behooves the FAA, the wider UAS pilot population, and the nation in general to take adequate time to fully consider the issues and alternatives more fully, and implement them in stages, as the technology and techniques become available and are sufficiently tested for integration into the NAS.

Using the United States NAS as a ‘test bed’ for implementation of commercial profit-making schemes does not serve national security, aircraft safety, or good common sense. Thus, I suggest the following:

a.   Allow the proposed methods to be tested elsewhere, while the FAA evaluates the effect and advisability of such proposed money-making schemes on the NAS

b.   Institute a moratorium on further regulation-making, until a public meeting can be held to discuss and evaluate the issue in more depth, with all stakeholders represented.

Include the UAS recreational pilots in the dialogue (both legacy RC pilots, FPV/Racing pilots, and recreational ‘camera drone’ pilots)

• Avoid considering legacy groups such as the AMA to represent the general population (sales figures alone demonstrate how the UAS pilot population far exceeds that of RC modelers, and thus representation (if biased) should be based more towards UAS pilots than towards RC modelers, as is the current situation)

• Societal Costs of NPRM Implementation
  • Law Enforcement Cost, Impact, and Considerations

The negative impact to society from the proposed NPRM may be felt most at the financial and operational levels by the FAA itself and to any involved law enforcement or national security agencies.

Laws, rules, and regulations which are understood by and accepted by the general public require little or no enforcement. Rules which are perceived as draconian, useless, or unfair are generally ignored by the public, and thus require extensive enforcement.

With these enforcement efforts are associated high costs in time, effort, and capital. In addition, it places the focus of law enforcement authorities away from more imperative and time-sensitive matters, and diverts that focus onto less critical issues and objectives. 

• Unfair and Biased Representation

While the FAA’s intentions are to provide well-reasoned, clearly-stated and obviously-needed regulations which consider the interests and rights of all stakeholders, the implementation of this NPRM would result in either the actuality or appearance of unfairness, bias, and illegality.

When a large number of corporations stand to profit from a ruling, while the same ruling results in financial cost and hardship on the general public, the ruling appears biased, and presents the impression of unfairness.  When the interests of large corporations are advanced over the interests of the general public, that perception is increased.

With implementation of this NPRM, a clear message would be sent to the public that this very thing has become a reality; that the recreational pilot has been ‘pushed out’ of the skies in favor of large corporate delivery services which provide limited and questionable benefits to society.

Regarding aviation, when one group of pilots receives different treatment (or is held to different standards, practices, and control) than another groups (or groups), then an unfair situation does in fact exist. The use of differing identification and control systems for manned and unmanned aircraft not only does not make sense in the terms of technical efficiency; it also provides a dual standard.

The reduced efficiency of such a system presents an increased safety hazard in the NAS, counter to the intentions of the NPRM, and the stated goals of the FAA.

• Civil Rights Considerations

Not only does the NPRM present an obvious and egregious civil right violation in the form of mass surveillance, it presents violations in terms of providing various standards of performance for different groups (bias). In addition, a number of other potential (or actual) civil rights violations or infringements are possible under the rules of the proposed NPRM, to wit:

-The use of USS provides a virtual ‘cost’ for using the airspace of the United States. The proceeds from these costs are not received by the United States, but by private organizations.

-The airspace use ‘cost’ (via subscription to USS and associated fees) is not equally shared; some segments of the community are charged, while others are not.

-Relieving the military from basic compliance with Remote ID provides a system where the appendages of the U.S. government are not subject to the laws of the U.S. government, an illegal and intolerable situation. Military operational considerations and security may make the data derived from remote ID not applicable to the public view, but the data should exist, for FAA and/or congressional oversight, as allowed by law and applicability.

• Impact on STEM and Education

The effect of limiting available airspace for non-commercial UAS flight (e.g., recreational and educational) can be expected to have an adverse effect on STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics) implementation and efficiency in schools nationwide.

UAS provide a unique tool to create and promote interest in STEM, through the practical (and fun) application of various science and engineering principles and applications. These applications cover a broad spectrum of science and technology, and include aeronautics, artificial intelligence, cartography, chemistry, computer science, electronics, mathematics, meteorology, physics, robotics, and telecommunications, to name but a few.

Allowing a limited number of approved flying areas will result in a decrease in opportunities for children and young adults to be exposed to drone flight as part of school science projects. No longer can they take a field trip to a nearby park and see what all this math and science is about; how it can be used for activities and applications they are interested in. This is bound to decrease the number of students who take an interest in STEM and related applications in technology. We have seen that the reduction of graduating students with STEM-based degrees negatively impacts the economy, the national GNP, and the nation’s capabilities.

As such, this area also has national security ramifications. Any program that would limit exposure to new and exciting technological applications, and serve to potentially decrease interest in STEM in education, does not in fact serve national security interests. 

1. FRIA Solutions

Suggesting that FRIA (drone parks or drone cages) be limited to the few existing areas seems short-sighted, at best. In addition, proposing a mere twelve month period for applications to add FRIA scarcely allows time to accomplish this, and can be seen as a method of appearing to allow applications, while concurrently setting the ‘bar’ too high to actually allow more FRIA. Finally, proposing a timed phase-out of existing FRIA serves to alarm the pilot population, and convince them that the FAA is actually trying to drive recreational pilots from the skies.

In the alternative, I suggest that the FAA restrict airspace as required (around major air routes, airports, and even possible UAS delivery route corridors), but leave the rest of the NAS alone, instead of excluding it all offhand.

The public has entrusted a large amount of public lands to the government, lands designated for our recreation (which drone flying is, to many of us). The majority of these public lands exist in areas of low TLA (Technological Level Area) capability. As such, flight in and around these ‘wild’ and undeveloped lands will have little effect on manned aircraft, drone delivery services, safety, or the recreation of fellow citizens.

I propose the FAA designate all National Forest and BLM lands as FRIA. This will allow exclusionary regulations in the rest of the NAS, while still allowing remote pilots in each state access to the skies in a safe and easily accessible manner.

Summary:

I propose a solution based on cooperation, not contention between stakeholders. The NPRM (as it stands) appears to reflect only the concerns and objectives of commercial and national security interests, not of the general UAS pilot population. It is understandable that the NPRM reflects as it does, with the FAA having only received limited input, and primarily from the parties to whom the NPRM appears to cater.

I suggest consideration of the legitimate concerns of the primary stakeholders (the actual UAS pilots) will result in a more balanced, effective solution to the challenge of A) providing a viable method for UAS ID, registration, and tracking and B) effecting a solution which meets the needs and concerns of the national security and law enforcement stakeholders, as well as those of commercial and recreational stakeholders.

As written, the proposed NPRM appears biased towards commercial interests, and reflects a solution only acceptable to them. Consideration and implementation of improved solutions will result in wider acceptance of (and compliance with) the proposed rules, as well as increased NAS safety and national security.  

Finally, I would suggest the FAA follow the guidelines of the U.S. Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, which suggests an independent, peer-reviewed risk assessment be performed prior to actions attended to address risk management issues (such as remote ID, ADS-B, etc.).

Thank you for your time and consideration in this matter, and please allow me to say thank you for your service to our nation and national airspace.

Regards,