The Emerging Counter-UAS Market

No sooner did the drone (UAS) market take off than the counter-drone or C-UAS (Counter-UAS) market got off the ground, as well. After all, something had to be done about those pesky rascals, right? For as long as there have been drones, there have been people wanting to shoot them down. That is actually what the first drones were made for – to be shot down, by ‘air defense artillery’ (ADA), when used for gunnery practice. 

Today’s C-UAS techniques range from quite sophisticated (and expensive) to very simple. They give an (imaginary) alternative to the angry farmer with a shotgun. They provide a means for law enforcement to disable or destroy unlawful drones. They provide a series of techniques for the integrated monitoring and defense of the national airspace (NAS) and of strategic national assets and infrastructure.

While not directly targeting drones, the FAA (Federal Aviation Administration) looks to be one of the biggest players in the counter-UAS world…well, in the counter recreational UAS world, at least. The restrictive rules they propose for Remote ID and Tracking of drones may be more effective in clearing the skies than an army of farmers with shotguns (or a fistful of fancy C-UAS technology).

To stay on track, I’ll focus on emerging anti-drone (or counter-UAS) technologies and providers, though.

The fourth C-UAS USA conference will be held in March, in Washington, D.C. The cost for the three-day event is $599 for government, police, and military. The rest of us get to pay $1,695. I guess I won’t be attending.  Below is a copy of their advertisement:

Counter UAS Winter – Agenda

Counter UAS Winter - Agenda

The World’s leading Counter UAS Summit is back for it’s fourth information packed iteration!  Just one year ago, we were just starting to explore what Counter UAS really involved by focusing on CUAS challenges & solutions for both military and domestic agencies. One year later we have become the global go to summit that tackles a wide variety of CUAS topics ranging from protecting airports, drone swarms, directed energy weapons, EW systems, S&T challenges and counter terrorism.

This March 29-April 2, 2020 in Washington, D.C we will take an even closer view on how to integrate the latest technology designed to combat emerging drone threats, while working towards improving the regulatory issues facing all sectors.

Topics Covered Include:


* Military’s Counter-UAS acquisition goals
* Countering drone swarms
* Defending against autonomous UAS
* C-UAS requirements
* Protecting critical infrastructure
* Using APS to fight UAS
* Soft kill and hard kill technologies
* Use of UAS by terrorist groups
* Military’s Counter-UAS requirements
* Mounted C-UAS weapon systems

That’s all well and good for the government types with a huge budget, but what about John Q. and Jane Q. Public, who merely want to stop those pesky FPV (First-Person View) racers from zipping around the neighborhood? Well, the first place I checked was Amazon, searching for counter-drone.  I mostly found drones…and hidden spy camera detectors.

While Amazon may not be selling anti-drone stuff, they have received a patent for ‘countermeasures’ to protect their ‘Prime Air’ drone delivery systems.  None of it seems to be new technology, but the integration of various COTS (commercial off-the-shelf) equipment may be enough.

The system is based on both a ‘mesh’ network and inter-drone communication, using data sharing “to confirm or cross-check data such as location, heading, altitude, and so forth”, to detect data differences and signs of a drone being ‘compromised’.

“Disagreement between data generated by the first UAV with external data from the second UAV may result in the determination that the first UAV is compromised,” is how the patent application explains it.

Here’s a figure of the system, from the 2014 patent application:

The communication system proposes encrypted FHSS (Frequency-Hopping Spread Spectrum) to secure the data-links. In the event of a compromise, the UAV can perform an automatic RTH (Return to Home) or avoid by landing (apparently wherever the ‘jamming’ is encountered). That should be interesting.

In addition to the anti-jamming capabilities, Amazon claims to have a sophisticated ‘detect-and-avoid’ mechanism (which begs the question of why remote ID and tracking is needed for recreational UAS).  I am assuming that the remote ID would come into play when Amazon reports recreational UAS (RUAS) which interfere with their important socks and doodad-delivery operations (and thus require those sophisticated detect-and-avoid capabilities).

But this isn’t really counter-UAS…just Amazon protecting their drones. I wanted to find more direct counter-drone technologies. I found some, but most aren’t in the average anti-drone citizen’s budget (According to a 2019 study by Sandia National Laboratories, out of 123 C-UAS products for which pricing information was available, 77 cost more than $100,000). Below are a few of the more common systems:

DroneShield (an Australian company) makes a drone gun which emits a jamming signal (range up to 1.5 miles) which will interfere with the C2 (command and control) signal between the offending UAV and its remote controller.

Lockheed-Martin ain’t messing with tiny guns. They propose a bigger solution: Athena (Advanced Test High Energy Asset). The tower-mounted laser system fires from 30-120KW (kilo-watts) at offending drones, knocking them right out of the sky (and maybe onto grandma’s head).

Delft Dynamics (a Netherlands firm) proposes a less overt strategy: their Drone Catcher is a counter-UAV drone, which tracks offending drones and catches them in a net (in order to preserve evidence/images and prevent things from falling on grandma’s head).

The SkyWall 100 uses a shoulder-fired weapon which sends a drone-catching net, which then descends via parachute. Grandma might like this idea.

With ‘all the’ (like, three) incidents of people trying to smuggle some weed to their poor imprisoned buddies, it was just a matter of time until someone made something like Sky Fence.  It is effectively a series of detectors and jammers which spoof the C2 signals and command an RTH (Return to Home), simultaneously reporting where ‘home’ is (so the cops can be waiting when the drone comes back with the package undelivered.

Let’s not forget the old ‘eagle attack’ scenario, where eagles (or other raptors) are trained to hunt down drones. That didn’t work out so well, so that particular technology has been put back in its nest for now.

If old-fashioned physical attacks are too retro for you, then Maldrone software provides a way to spoof the C2 signals of a drone and then steal it. The misuse potential for this is high…but then, hey, how are you gonna afford a Remote ID-capable Mavic 7 Pro? Well, just steal one…assuming the software is cheaper than the drone.

Most of the technologies I looked at were categorized loosely into a few groups and sub-groups

Detection

Radio receivers to detect C2 links between UAS and remote controllers

Radar systems

Audio sensors (to listen for UAS motor/propeller noise)

Optical sensors (to ID in-flight UAS)

Counter-Measures

Jammers (which send signals to interrupt the UAS’ C2 link)

Spoofers (to send false position data, emulating a GNSS navigation system)

Hackers (which try to take control of the UAS’ C2 link)

Sonic

UAS Attack

Lasers (typically LED)

EMP (Electro-Magnetic Pulse)

High-energy microwave (using a continuous wave-CW signal as opposed to EMP’s momentary burst)

UAS Capture

Net-deployment

Attack birds (raptors)

Note the two general categories appear to be A) detection and B) counter-measures of some type.

A report from the Center for the Study of the Drone at Bard College provides some good data on available C-UAS technology.  Bard researchers found 537 systems for sale – hundreds more than they found in the previous year’s study. Three hundred and seventy five of these products are billed for intercepting and disabling UAS, while the rest detect them.

Find the report here:  https://dronecenter.bard.edu/projects/counter-drone-systems-project/counter-drone-systems-2nd-edition/

To summarize some of the statistics presented:

Of the 375 C-UAS systems found, the ‘majority’ (unspecified) are designed for ground-based use: 260 fixed or stationary, 55 mobile, and 59 undefined.

106 are handheld, and 36 mounted on-board a UAS

12 use a combination of fixed ground-based elements and portable (e.g., handheld) devices

323 C-UAS systems are capable of detection

190 of those use a single sensor, and 130 use a combination of sensors

42 use a combination of three or more sensor types

RF (159) and radar (147) are the most common detection elements

EO (113) and IR (111) systems (typically used together)

Acoustic sensors; 34

Of the 362 systems using ‘interdiction’ methods, 147 use a single method, 215 a combination

Jamming (both RF and GNSS); 259 systems use some form of jamming

31 spoofing systems, 18 laser-based, 27 employ nets, 8 use ‘suicide drones’

Well, as we can see, there are a burgeoning number of ‘solutions’ to counter UAS activities, but they are primarily aimed at and developed for large (e.g., governmental) organizations. As far as the angry homeowner who doesn’t want drones flying over the swimming pool while his daughters are playing, or for the angry farmer who doesn’t like drones flying over his cattle and scaring them…well, it’s a tough old world out there.

As much as anti-drone citizens may like to combat drones using these techniques and technologies, the simple fact is…they can’t. For one thing, it is illegal (in a number of ways) to send jamming signals or interfere with aircraft in operation (a felony in many cases). A great paper on just what these laws are and their effect can be found at one of my main ‘go-to guys’ as far as drone law; (Johnathin) Rupprecht Law Firm (apologies if the name I gave is not totally correct). Here’s a link to his great paper:

7 BIG PROBLEMS WITH COUNTER DRONE TECHNOLOGY (DRONE JAMMERS, ANTI DRONE GUNS, ETC.)

Still, how many angry farmers or dads even know of these laws? How many think it is their God-given right to take ‘them pesky drones’ out of the skies? How many will try it first (using whatever means are at hand), and worry about legal consequences later? The answers to those questions may be problematic, at best.

Okay, well citizens can’t (legally) shoot your Mavic Mini out of the sky, or jam and spoof your Autel EVO. How about the cops or other authorities? Well, per law, there are only four organizations in the U.S. who are allowed to take C-UAS actions (up to and including the use of ‘reasonable force’)

                -The Department of Justice (DoJ)

                -The Department of Energy (DoE)

                -The Department of Defense (DoD)

                -The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

That leaves the other law enforcement agencies, well, sort of out of luck – for now. We can expect some laws to change in the near future, allowing local police agencies to take at least limited C-UAS measures. Yet even the non-destructive measures have considerations. For example, if a police officer used a system to ‘spoof’ or ‘hack’ your C2 signal and take control of your drone, that officer would legally then become the RPIC (Remote Pilot in Charge) and thus be required to have an FCC Part 107 certification to fly the drone (even if you are not required to be Part 107 certified).

The waters will surely become even murkier, before they get clearer…

Well, what does all this mean to the common, recreational drone flier? To the drone racer? You’ll still be liable to meet angry people, who will try to swat your drone out of the skies (or take it or the controller from your hands) – if you fly places where angry, aggressive people are likely to be found. If you’re flying out in the country, it might be just you and the angry farmer. Either way, anti-droners are likely to use sticks, towels, rocks, whatever they can get their hands on, if they are angry enough. If they can’t get sophisticated equipment, they will use less sophisticated equipment.

That angry neighbor may not have an electronic drone jammer, but an automatic paintball gun may do just as much damage, if deployed effectively during launch or landing operations. In the end, all the laws in the world won’t change that. The best counter C-UAS (CCUAS) method is to not fly in a way or place which might result in being jammed or shot at.

Even if the angry neighbor doesn’t attack you or your UAS, he or she has available a free application on their phone which will (if close enough and held at the right angle) theoretically identify your UAS. That’s right now this application is out. Once the Remote ID and Tracking rules the FAA proposed become law, the hit-or-miss capability of the current applications will be replaced by a sure-fire identification.

Now, the angry neighbor won’t see your name, home address or other PII (Personally Identifiable Information), as the FAA calls it. But what they will (eventually) see is a Unique UAS ID (UUID) or at least a session ID to which the UUID can be correlated (for UAS duly registered and Remote ID capable). This can be reported to law enforcement (along with pictures of you and/or your drone), who can then match a name and address with your UUID. Bingo! Evidence! That might be better than a big stick or radio jammer, anyway (at least if they are patient enough to wait for that whole process to happen).

As to law enforcement, they may not be able to shoot you down or capture your drone (at the current moment), but they can certainly use the Remote ID capability to get location coordinates (and directions) to not only the location of the UAS, but also to the location of the remote controller (and the person manipulating the controls (the PIC, Pilot in Charge), who is legally responsible for all actions or inactions of the UAS while in flight. *

*That is, for all compliant UAS. Unregistered or non-compliant UAS would not be easily identified, but that is a relatively easy matter to address: the FAA merely demands that DJI (and all other major manufacturers of Ready to Fly (RTF) drones) force a firmware upgrade to all non-compliant UAS, disabling them from flight. Your controller will simply never establish a link with the UAS. Once the UAS has been upgraded to RID (Remote ID) capability (for a cost, at least to an authorized USS-UAS Service Supplier) it will (potentially) be able to fly again.

At least, that is the scheme proposed to the FAA by DJI (the major recreational/commercial UAS manufacturer). The FAA chose an alternate (and more costly) scheme. If the existing DJI receiver/controller functionality can be upgraded by firmware, that option will still exist. If this capability is not possible under the new RID rules, then the non-compliant UAS would be ‘geo-fenced’ out of existence, with unlocking only available for FAA-designated drone parks (FAA-Recognized Identification Area or FRIA).

If you’re crazy enough to be flying around any military areas or power plants, then they can and will stop your drone. If you’re breaking the law, the police can at least identify and locate you. If you’re on the lam from the Feds, they can shoot you down (or at least use ‘reasonable force’).

So, for the recreational and lawful flier, the whole C-UAS counter-drone world is relatively irrelevant. That stuff is for use against terrorists and criminals. If you somehow fly your home-made (and non-compliant) FPV racer, the authorities will consider your unidentified drone to be either a terrorist or a criminal. And that’s where C-UAS technologies come into play.

In addition to your drone being destroyed or disabled (and legally confiscated), you are likely to face some serious ‘splainin’ to the officials and quite likely end up facing federal, state, and local charges. That’s a high price to pay for some nighttime FPV zooming through downtown, or some rural barnstorming. Whether C-UAS and the penalties will be a real deterrent to rebel fliers remains to be seen.

I’ll be keeping an eye on developments, and write more about this subject as matters develop. Until  then, I guess I’ll fly safe and sane, and be glad none of the stuff I mentioned above will be used against me.

Keep on flyin’, and see you in the next post!

Hey, Venezuela – What You Doing With Those Drones?

Long, long ago (in 2012) Venezuela purchased some Mohajer 2 (‘Migrant’) drones from the IRI (Islamic Republic of Iran). These “Sant’ Arpia” (as Venezuela terms them) drones are light ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) drones with a speed of 200km/h (124.74 mph/107.99 knots) and a range of 50km (31mi). Their ceiling is 3,352m (11,000 ft) and their ‘endurance’ is 90 minutes. They are easily equipped with a variety of sensors, or armed with two rocket pods armed with six each RPG-7 rockets (better armament in the -4 and -6 variants). A new drone factory in Maracay makes the likelihood of Mohajer 6 versions high. The -6 variant is a UCAV (Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle).

The Venezuelan air force (AMNBV or FAV) purchased 12, with some going to the state-owned petroleum research organization PDVSA. The air force drones are operated by the 83rd UAV Squadron and the 8th GAIVRE (Intelligence and Reconnaissance Group). Disposition of further drones manufactured locally at the Maracay factory are unknown.

This begs the question: A) what is a once-rich and now-starving country doing buying expensive UAV and…B) who are they using them on? Witnessing the actions of the government in recent history, it is quite likely their own citizens are targets.

In a sort of poetic justice (or some say as a ‘false flag’ to justify suppression of the political opposition), in August 2018 President Nicolas Maduro was reportedly targeted by a pair of DJI Matrice 600 drones (each armed with a kilogram of C4 explosive), while the military guard at the event ran away. Later, eleven members of the press were arrested, and the official story of the assassination was (to say the least) a bit suspicious.

So, who is the quite possibly paranoid Venezuelan government going to use these UAVs on? Their neighbor Columbia (Maduro directly accused the Columbian president after the ‘assassination attempt’)? Brazil, which dominates the South American drone world? No, the answer seems more likely to be against its own people, if they riot in the streets for bread. Or against the political opposition, should some ever coalesce in such an oppressive environment, and under such an oppressive regime.

So, I’m asking again…hey Venezuela…what you doing with them drones? Shouldn’t you be buying your citizens some food or something?

Possession of Illegal Drones

I am not looking into a crystal ball right now, but as I ponder the FAA’s proposed rules on UAS Remote ID and Tracking (the last part always conveniently left out), I can see the future coming…

The idea of people flying fast drones around, whipping in and out of buildings and around obstacles has surely got some law-enforcement types concerned. That concern has manifest in the new proposed (but pretty much in the bag) UAS rules, which would limit such ‘racing drones’ to little ‘drone parks’ (or FRIA: FAA-Restricted ID Areas).

Without RFID and tracking, these UAS would become useless and illegal, except when flown in the ‘drone parks.’ But you know the regulators aren’t going to stop there; eventually all UAS without Remote ID and Tracking capability will be outlawed.

Outlawed, you say? Yes, outlawed. Face it, the authorities do NOT want people having such a capability – to fly as free as a bird, zipping around in an unchained and unregulated fashion. Flying around with cameras, no less…sticking their pesky noses in places they don’t belong. So I envision that some time in the future (perhaps not as long as we think), it will be illegal to have a ‘race drone’ without Remote ID capability, and one not registered for flying in the ‘drone park’.

Because you can bet the farm that’s the only place they will be tolerated. There is no possibility of implementing Airborne Collision and Avoidance Systems (ACAS) with those little rascals zipping around, moving in unpredictable manners and just messing up those Amazon and Pizza Hut delivery drones’ AI logic. So we can pretty much kiss them goodbye (me, before I even get started good).

It’s like the first days of aviation…those ‘barnstorming’ days are over – a bunch of people flying around like madmen, however they wish simply will not be tolerated in the modern environment (or as the FAA would laughably say, ecosystem) of the NAS (National Air-Space).

Now, of course the government is creating outlaws out of good citizens by such legislation (much as they did in the ‘drug wars’). For it is as sure as the sunrise that once those people got a taste of the freedom and perspective they get from flying FPV, not many will be willing to give it up. And with FAA and law enforcement resources spread so thin, there are surely going to be ‘outlaw fliers’ or ‘rebel fliers’.

Knowing they cannot enforce the rules effectively, I predict the law enforcement types will simply make fines that will make us reconsider our quest to fly like the eagles…they will make fines so high for flying (or even possessing) an illegal drone that it will make many reconsider (and not a few decide to submit, obey, and go fly in the ‘drone park’ with the toy drones and RC planes).

But by golly, until then…we can fly like the birds, getting a view that no human has ever had before, a sense of mobility and speed…and (dare I say it?) of freedom few have ever had. They may try to take our race drones away later, but for now, we can still fly…while we still can.

But watch out for that future…it’s coming up fast, and as hard to avoid as the most difficult obstacle…

Iran’s New Battle Drone

Iran unveiled its new Saegheh-2 (Thunderbolt) ‘battle drone’ on 31 January, 2019, at the Eqtedar (‘Power’) 40 military arms conference in Tehran, Iran.

Using a design obviously copied from the MQ-117 Sentinel (that had been command hijacked over Iran on 5 December 2011), the new drone represents the pinnacle of Iran’s UAV fleet. An older version of the re-engineered Sentinel UCAV (Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle) had been in deployment prior to this. Israeli IDF Air Forces reporting one of the drones (Saegheh-1) armed with four explosive devices (of a type unspecified) had been shot down on 10 February 2018.

Of course, Iran hardly needs to reverse-engineer U.S. UAVs to acquire a combat drone – the communist PRC (Peoples’ Republic of China) is selling their CJ-1 Wing Loong II (Pterodactyl) drones to all bidders worldwide (and selling them like hotcakes). But the Saegheh drone must put a good taste in the mouths of the Iranian military, coming from their enemies as almost manna from heaven. The U.S. version was quite a capable UAV, and it’s a safe bet Iran tried its best to improve upon an already good product.

The specifications on the new drone (called the Saegheh-2 ‘Thunderbolt’ by Iran) are similar to those of the RQ-117 Sentinel:

20m (66′) wingspan, tail-less ‘flying wing’ design

Ceiling approx. 50,000′ on RQ-170 (25,000’ on Sagheh)

EO/IR sensor with belly-mounted AESA phased-array radar

Turbofan power-plant (copied from German design)

Cruising speed 300km/h (186.4 mph or 161.9kn)

‘Endurance’ (flight) time of 4.5 hours

Range is reported to be 450km (279.6 miles/242.98nmi)

Payload  50kg (110 lbs.).

Saegheh-1 reportedly was armed with four Sadid (‘unerring’) precision-guided anti-tank missiles. Saegheh-2 is armed with two (carried either internally or externally)

Iran claims their version (also called the Shahed-191 or ‘Eyewitness’) can fly 2,000 miles for 24 hours, with one refueling

Fifty of the Shahed-1 version was built (as of 2019); unknown numbers of new Shahed-2 have been built.

In addition, Iran boasts a number of different UAV in its ‘space forces’:

Ababil-2 (‘Miraculous Bird’) Multi-role, long-range (over 100km/62mi), low-technology. Single ‘pusher’ propeller. Three meter (9.84’) wingspan. Hezbollah uses the ‘Mirsad-1’ variant

This image has an empty alt attribute; its file name is abail-hesa.jpg

Ababil-3 (‘Sparrow’) ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) long-range (over 100km/62 mi/80.99nmi),

Wingspan: 7m (22.9’) Speed: 200km/h (120mph/107.99kn), Endurance: 4hrs, Ceiling: 5,000m (16,000’) 

Payload: 40kg (88lb) payload

This image has an empty alt attribute; its file name is ababil-3.jpg

Qasef -1 Loitering munition (‘suicide drone’), multi-role, including ISR and ground attack

Based on Ababil-2 airframe, used by Houthis to attack radar segment of Patriot air defense system

This image has an empty alt attribute; its file name is qasef-2k-1.jpg

Shahed-129A (‘Eyewitness’) MALE multi-role UCAV (AKA Saegheh-1)

(Copy of U.S. MQ-1 Predator)

Wingspan: 16m (52.5’) Engine: Rotax 914 4-cyl, 4-stroke turbo 115hp Cruise speed: 150km/h (93mph, 81kn) Endurance: 24hrs              Combat Range: 1,700km (1100mi, 920nmi), Ceiling: 7,300m (24,000’)

Payload: 400kg (881.8lb)   4x Sadid-345 PGM (Precision-guided munition)

This image has an empty alt attribute; its file name is shahed-129.jpg

Mohajer-2 (‘Immigrant’) Light-med ISR (auto-pilot)

Wingspan: 3.8m (12.46’)  Engine: 25hp, 2-cylinder WAE 342

Max speed: 200km/h (120mph, 110kn) Endurance: 1.5hrs, Range 50km (31mi, 26.99nmi), Ceiling: 3,350m (10,990’)  

Mohajer-2N range 150km (93.2mi, 80.99nmi) Endurance: 6hrs,

Payload 15kg (33.06lb)  

This image has an empty alt attribute; its file name is mohajer-2.jpg

Saegheh-1 (‘Honest’) AKA QOM-1  Multi-role

Basically a Mohajer-4B with two MANPADS mounted on pylons     

Engine:  four-cylinder, 2-stroke, 50hp Limbach L550E (pusher)        Speed: 200km/h (124mph, 107kn)  Endurance: 6hrs Range: 200km (124mi, 107nmi) Ceiling: 5,486m (18,000’)

Payload:  Variable

One of these overflew USS Boxer on 18 July 2019, and was shot down

This image has an empty alt attribute; its file name is sadegh-2.jpg

Mohajer-4 ISR

Engine: four-cylinder, 2-stroke, 50hp Limbach L550E (pusher)

Endurance: 7hrs  Range: 150km (93.2mi/80.98nmi)                       Ceiling: 5,486m (18,000’)

Payload:  2x Hydra-7 un-guided 70mm rockets

This image has an empty alt attribute; its file name is mohajer-4-1.jpg

Mohajer-6 Multirole, including ISTAR and ground attack

Wingspan: 3.8m (12.46’) Engine: two-cylinder, 25hp WAE-342   

Speed: 200km/h (124mph, 107kn)   Endurance: 12 hrs                    Range: 200km (124mi. 107nmi) Ceiling: 5,486m (18,000’)

Payload: 40kg (88.1lb) 2x Qaem TV-IR guided missile, or jamming, ECM/ECCM

This image has an empty alt attribute; its file name is mohajer-6.jpg

Toufan-1 (‘Flood’) One-way attack

This image has an empty alt attribute; its file name is toufan-1.jpg

Fotros (‘Unwinged Angel’) Multirole, including ISR and ground attack

Range: 1,700-2,000km (1,056-1,242mi)  Endurance: 16-30 hrs.        Ceiling: 7,600m (25,000’).

Project started in 2013, believed abandoned in 2018

This image has an empty alt attribute; its file name is fotros-2-1.jpg

Karrar (‘Repeated Attacker’ or ‘Striker’) Multirole

Originally a target drone (copy of U.S. Beechcraft MQM-107 Streaker, with modifications from S. African SKUA), has been modified with three ‘hardpoints’ to mount weaponry.

Engine: Single turbojet-propelled, Speed: 900km/h (560mph, 540nmi) Range: 1,000km (620 mi/135nmi) Combat range: 500km (310mi, 270nmi)

Launch: Rocket-assist launching, parachute recovery

Payload:  Missile: 2x Kowsar (medium-range anti-ship)  or                                 

                            1x Nasr-1 (short-range anti-ship)

               Bombs: 1xMK-82 500lb   (low-drag, general-purpose)

                            2×250-lb bombs (low-drag, general-purpose)

This image has an empty alt attribute; its file name is karrar-2.jpg

Hamaseh (‘Epic’) Multirole, HALE (high-altitude, long-endurance)

Engine: Single-engine, twin boom; Max speed: 194km/h (121mph), 200km (120mi, 107nmi) Range:  Endurance: up to 11 hours flight time (depending on payload), Ceiling: 4,600m (15,000’)

Payload: general-purpose bombs, grenades, or rockets

This image has an empty alt attribute; its file name is hemaseh-4.jpg

Shahed-171 Simorg (‘Phoenix’) Multirole (direct copy of RQ-170)

This image has an empty alt attribute; its file name is shahed-171-2.jpg

IRN-170 Multi-role (hijacked RQ-170)

Iran’s UAV air-fleet ranges from modern, almost-advanced UAV/UCAV to refurbished 1980’s technology…from (relatively) modern factory-manufactured, to garage-built quality. (Note: it doesn’t take the most modern UAV to make a significant military impact, as demonstrated in Iraq and Syria recently).

Addition of the IRI (Islamic Republic of Iran) latest UAV/UCAV indicates not only that the IRI possesses modern UAV technology, but also that they possess a ‘network’ of state-owned or state-supported UAV manufacturers – manufacturers quickly learning from re-engineering and production experience, as well as from experience on the active battlefields of SWA (South-West Asia).

The end result is not a negligible factor in area air operations. UAVs provide an important function in the IRI’s strategy of asymmetric warfare (fighting against a superiorly armed and equipped opponent); cause the impact of modern manned military aircraft, at a fraction of the expense and time.

Whether these drones will see any action against US forces or UAVs remains to be seen, but it seems likely that Iran will not take getting one of its top generals killed laying down. Their already great hatred for the US appears to be inflamed to a high degree by recent developments.

Whether the Iranian Air Force Special Operations general (killed three days after the new drone’s unveiling -ironically by a U.S. MQ-9 Reaper drone and Hellfire missiles) was involved in deployment of the drones, or in operational control of them is unknown*, but his death (on 3 January, 2020) would be considered by some to be a U.S. response to this drone development and threat to the U.S. (and its ally Israel).

Does this (or any) Iranian UAV pose a direct threat to U.S. military or government personnel?

          -One IRI drone was overflying the USS Boxer and was shot down

          -20 Jun 2019    RQ-4 Global Hawk shot down by IRI

Whether directly affecting the U.S. military, these UAV do affect U.S. interests and allies:

          -One IRI drone was shot down by Israel

Iran-supported Hezbollah uses these drones regularly (often flying from a reported drone base in the Bekaa Valley of Lebanon), the Houthi ‘rebels’ use them in Yemen (and a number have been intercepted en-route to Yemen), and they are widely used in (IRI ally) Syria and Iraq, against ISIS/ISIL.

          – May 2019      Used in attack on Saudi oilfields

-10 July            Used against Kurds in Iraq

          -12 July Hezbollah leader brags of sophisticated UAV technology

          -July      Used against Saudi airports on Yemen border

Iranian UAVs have been exported to Venezuela, Syria, Sudan, and Nigeria, but Iran still does not equal China as the new drone-arms king. For an idea of Who Has What, see  https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/reports/world-drones/who-has-what-countries-with-armed-drones/

While drones and UAV/UCAV are important military weapons, perhaps one of the best weapons is using the enemy’s division against him; when virtually half of the US population decries actions against innocent old Iran (and the ‘murder’ of its Special Operations general by drone), the Psy Ops factor has gone beyond the immediate effects of any military weapon or system. The will to make war is a more important factor than particular weapons, as Iran well knows.

* Major General Qasem Soleimani was promoted (24 Jan 2011) and appointed as commander of IRGC-QF (Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, Quds Force). He was one of the most recognizable and popular generals in Iran, and had a close relationship with (and access to) Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini

The Colorado Drone Swarm Task Force- as Elusive as the Reported Drones Are

The task force formed in response to reported sightings of ‘drone swarms’ over NE Colorado and SW Nebraska is proving to be as elusive as the drone swarms (and their operators) are. The task force was noisily convened in response to nationwide coverage of a mass of reported drone sightings at night. The FAA reportedly organized it, and it was reportedly attended by 70 military agencies or offices and 15 law enforcement agencies, in addition to the FBI and FAA.

The task force convened (in private session, with public and media not allowed). It then disappeared as quickly and quietly as the drones who swarmed over Colorado around Christmas.

No information about the task force appears on the FAA website, and no report of its operations or further intentions has been made available to news media or the public.

Happening right before the FAA Notice of Proposed Rule-making (NPRM -first released Christmas) and proposing a required identification of all UAS (Unmanned Aircraft Systems), the coincidence couldn’t have been more…coincidental. By the time the FAA proposal became official (1 January) and open for comment, the drone sightings were already recurring less and less often (and reported less and less reliably). By the time the task force was convened, the sightings had virtually stopped.

By the time the Colorado Department of Homeland Security special airplane was sent to fly over the area of the sightings with special sensors, the drone ‘swarms’ were history. By the time the media news reports had died down, so had the sightings. In fact, the authorities (not seemingly too worried about unidentified UAS flying at night (ostensibly in violation of FAA rules) too alarming, and they arrived only after the horse had left the barn, so to speak.

The news media has done no follow-up pieces (interestingly enough) since the eighth of January (a week ago as of this writing). No one has come forward and claimed responsibility, and no massive drone hunt seems to have been initiated.

In the face of such a dearth of information, I tried to locate this task force, or any published information about who met, what they discussed, and what they came up with. I think I’d have better luck finding those drones.

Just the fact of the task force’s secrecy and the its sudden disappearance are two possibly key pieces of information in the mystery of A) the disappearing drones and who was behind them and B) the disappearing task force, and who was behind it

I guess the next step is to start asking sheriff’s offices of the counties affected, (although I am not hopeful), and perhaps following up with the major news sources involved in reporting this (primarily the Denver Post). Again, I am not very hopeful.

One thing seems certain in this mystery (perhaps the only thing that is certain); it seems destined to remain a mystery, a dual mystery – about the mysterious drones and who was behind them, and about the mysterious, disappearing task force, and who was behind it.

At this point, we are stuck with conjecture, speculation, and perhaps a bit of wondering aloud. Somehow, that is not very reassuring, If the whole phenomenon was innocent, then it would have been quickly exposed as such. If it were criminal then charges would likely have been made and suspects identified. Leaving the whole thing in the dark like this just encourages speculation (never a good or productive idea). It makes one think of the ‘obvious’ explanations: 1) it was a real incident, mysterious, and has left our authorities baffled 2) it was known to authorities (each of which separately claimed to have no involvement), who gave a quick nod and wink to whoever ran the operation. Neither of those possibilities is very attractive.

One thing is (or seems) certain, no certificate of authorization (COA) was filed with or granted by the FAA. No flight plans were filed or mission overviews given to the FAA (who claims complete ignorance in the matter).

This brings to mind a third possibility: that of an international or multinational rogue corporation, which just doesn’t give a damn about the FAA or the authorities, and which conducted its own autonomous operation. None of the three possibilities (aliens or foreign sources, secret government operations or secret corporate operations) are good, none of them okay or legal.

Yet what we can do about it is the same as what we know about this incident…virtually nothing. I don’t really like that, but (as they say) ‘it is what it is’…or this case, what it isn’t.

Stay Tuned: Upcoming Posts for 1Q 2020

It’s an ambitious list, but here are some blog posts I intend to post during (optimally) the first quarter of this year. You’ll notice many are about regulatory issues (as we are in a comment period and the issue is time-sensitive), but I’ll try to interject other articles covering various categories of the Drone World.

Below is my list. Please feel free to comment on which you’d prefer to see first (or last, or not at all); I can easily adjust my output and write based on the needs of you, Dear Reader. So fire away! Here’s the list:

Regulatory:

‘Third Party’ UAS Service Suppliers (USS): A Bad Idea, or a REALLY Bad Idea?

Making Rules by Committee: Is That Even Legal?!

An Overview of Other Proposed (and Rejected) Remote ID and Tracking Methods

Who/What is the CDA? What Do They Want?

An Open Letter to the CDA

My Comment to the FAA (on Docket 2019-1100, Remote ID & Tracking)

UAS Aircraft

Flying Blind With DJI’s Mavic Mini

DJI Fly and the 64-bit Blues

Mavic Mini Altitude Test and Performance Characterization

Mavic Mini Wind Test

(Communist) China’s Wing Loong II Military Drone: Better Than The U.S. Raptor?

Film and Cinematography

Adventure Follow-Me With The SkyDio 2

The Best Drone Films

Capturing History with a Drone

Best Payload Cameras

Technology

Rejected Remote ID and Tracking Proposals: A Comparison

RFID: Will It Fit In The Drone World?

Anti-Drone Technology: An Overview

CDMA Overview

Why the New Dronosphere Needs 5-G Wireless

The Flying AI Supercomputer: SkyDio 2

Well,there it is. Feel free to add any subjects you’d like to see addressed; I’ll keep on the lookout for pertinent and interesting issues and topics to drone on about. Share with your friends; all input is welcome. I’ll be talking to some attorneys and law reviews in regards to UAS regulations and associated civil rights issues, so there may be a few articles not on this list popping up, as well.

Best regards and good flying!

The FAA’s Invitation to Anti-Drone Luddites

The FAA’s proposed Remote ID and Tracking rules for UAS (Unmanned Aerial Systems) will make some significant changes to the drone world, and to our national airspace. As the proposed rule stands, any operator of a UAS would be identified by position of the drone and the position of the operator/remote control.

Aside from being an outright invasion of our privacy and a violation of our civil rights, this portion of the rule would do the opposite of the rule’s intent (to increase safety). By letting anti-drone Luddites know your position, this feature potentially exposes you to the anger, wrath, and possibly physical violence of those who dislike drones.

By making PII (Personally Identifiable Information) available to third parties and the public, this rule opens the door for that Luddian retribution to come right to your home. Of course, the FAA and the ARC (Aviation Rule-making Committee) claim that by segmenting the ID data, they will protect your identity and personal information. That excuse is less than feeble in a world where Facebook and Google obtain and sell data on people, where the DHS and NSA regularly gather (and leak) mass data, and third parties of all kinds sell information for profit.

Before I go on, let’s back-track for a moment and examine the term ‘Luddite’. The definition is (per Google dictionary):

noun

  1. DEROGATORY a person opposed to new technology or ways of working.”a small-minded Luddite resisting progress”
  2. HISTORICAL a member of any of the bands of English workers who destroyed machinery, especially in cotton and woolen mills, that they believed was threatening their jobs (1811–16).

There have been Luddites since there has been innovation and technology. Some complained of factory machinery (the original ones), others have complained against the advent of automobiles, telephones, and computers. The claim is always similar: the new technology somehow infringes on their ‘rights’, and is unnatural (if God wanted us to have automobiles, He’d have given us wheels instead of feet).

The new anti-drone Luddites are the same ilk – fearful and ignorant. They figure that drones are here to invade our privacy, clutter up the airspace, and are just plain unnatural. A quick look on YouTube will show a number of confrontations between these Luddites and UAS pilots. We can expect them to waste law enforcement resources with their groundless complaints, to harass law-abiding citizens out to peacefully fly their drones, and in some cases to retaliate.

Giving them access to our locations (both drone and pilot) and to our personal information is lunacy, pure and simple. If the UAS Remote ID is simply a ‘digital license plate’, then the proposed rules beg the following questions:

-Why aren’t automobile license plates tied to a similar system that tracks the location of offending automobiles, and provides information about the owner/operators?

-What would be the public response if the DOT (Department of Transportation) decided to implement a similar system for automobiles?

The law enforcement and national security types claim this type of information broadcast is necessary for…safety. First, the safety record of recreational drones is quite good, with remarkably few incidents of damage or injury recorded during the thousands of drone flight hours thus far. So there is no outstanding safety issue in regards to drones; that’s just a made-up justification to support imposing this rule on us.

Secondly, there is nothing in the proposed rules that would actually increase safety. There are no ACAS (Air Collision Avoidance System) capabilities specified, and no means to avoid collisions. There is no means to prevent UAS from committing crimes or violating airspace rules. All the proposed rules do is allow law enforcement to determine -after the fact- who the drone is registered to. Real safety is proactive, not reactive.

As for national safety (the impetus behind tracking UAS and their pilots), if the national security folks really think these rules will deter criminals and terrorists (who have a marked tendency to disobey rules), they need to get in a new line of work. That excuse is so thin, it is almost laughable. Face it; ISIS would not abandon their (notional) plans for a drone attack just because there was an FAA rule saying they must first register them, or have remote ID and tracking capabilities.

With China selling military drones (copies of our military drones, but cheaper) to all comers, the drones these notional terrorists or invaders would potentially use will not be a DJI Phantom or Mavic (with their minimal payload capacities). The drones they use will most assuredly not have a remote ID and tracking capability (unless it is by them only). So enough of the nonsense excuses and justifications, okay?

But back to the Luddites. The proposed FAA rules are in effect an invitation to anti-drone Luddites to harass, intimidate, and potentially even harm law-abiding UAS pilots. They are a thinly-veiled attempt to drive recreational UAS (RUAS) from the skies, in order to facilitate corporate giants like Amazon and Pizza Hut plans for delivering us goods and services (of dubious utility) direct to our doors (without having to pay an actual human delivery driver).

Imagine if you were driving and a person thought you ‘cut them off’. Imagine them being able to use a ‘remote ID’ application to track your vehicle’s location, and to obtain your personal information. Visualize the possibilities of confrontation, retribution, or retaliation – none of them work out well, for any involved.

The simple fact is our civil liberties and reasonable expectation of privacy do not disappear once you or your drone are in the air, nor are they rendered irrelevant by the (mistaken) notion of improving airspace safety. I understand the need for improved visibility and control of our NAS (National Air-Space). I support legitimate law enforcement requirements. I get the concept of safely sharing the skies so giant multi-national corporations can increase their profits. What I don’t get (or find necessary in any way) is the capability of other citizens to monitor our flying activities, location, and history – and to obtain our personal information.

If all the FAA (and the giant corporations who have their ear) wanted was a simple ‘digital license plate’, then other existing technologies (such as broadcast RF, which DJI Aeroscope already provides, or RFID, which is used to ID and track virtually everything these days) would suffice.

Remote ID? Fine. Remote ID, with our information given to the public? No way. Remote ID and tracking, with the information available to third parties, law enforcement, and the public? Certainly not!

The proposed rules (FAA Docket 2019-1100) unnecessarily provide the public access to private information (or at least potentially do so), and that is NOT OKAY.

As responsible pilots, we will gladly comply with reasonable rules and regulations that actually make the skies safer, and serve to share the skies. As free Americans, we cannot support rules that A) contradict the intent and laws of Congress, B) are imposed without representation and lawful legislation, C) claim to be about ‘safety’ when promoting the opposite, and D) serve no purpose other than to facilitate private corporate desires or to promote further spying on the American public, under the auspices of safety and national security.

If these proposed ‘solutions’ offend and outrage you (or if you simply disagree with them), be sure to submit well-considered and respectful (yet clearly-stated) comments to the FAA. The comment period is open until 2 March, 2020. I would suggest first reading (or at least skimming through) both the ARC (Aviation Rule-making Committee) report (https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/media/UAS%20ID%20ARC%20Final%20Report%20with%20Appendices.pdf ), and the proposed FAA Rules for Remote ID and Tracking of UAS (https://www.faa.gov/uas/research_development/remote_id/ ).

The ARC report (near the end) provides a number of proposed methods, some of which may seem more sensible to you than the ones being considered for adoption. While reasonable comments and expressions of concern are allowed in the comment process, I have found it is always best to present a solution when identifying a problem. Perhaps one of the initially-proposed solutions (or your modification of it) would fit well with your comments (and lend you some credibility as not just a mere ‘nay-sayer’, but someone who can also propose reasonable alternatives).

In the meantime, fly free…while you still can. And watch out for Luddites.

Design a site like this with WordPress.com
Get started